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Abstract 
 
This article stems from a case study based on a series of in-depth interviews carried out on the All 
Russia Association of the Blind (VOS). It traces how two of the most successful VOS  enterprises, 
Enterprise 13 in Moscow and Revda in the Urals, responded to the dynamic changes (both 
economic and social) that confronted them after the introduction of the free market economy. It 
examines the strategies, developed and emergent, created since 1991 by these two enterprises. In 
particular it traces the emergence of the entrepreneurial manager and his adaptation to the 
catalyst of change - growth, through the development of creative and proactive solutions to these 
environmental changes. In essence the contention is that in a period of flux where turbulence is 
high and change inevitable strategic leadership, driven by an entrepreneurial spirit, comes to the 
fore as a natural consequence of market forces. Risk taking and high tolerance of ambiguity mark 
the innovative leader. 
 
For hundreds of years the Russians had lived under centralising, autocratic regimes. In April 
1985 Gorbachev‟s Perestroika changed this. Perestroika introduced the seeds of a democratic 
political system and the beginnings of a market economy which was to supplant the failing Marxist 
model. Inevitably, the outcome was a situation of unparalleled complexity. Perestroika broke the 
Russian business mould. It created uncertainty by introducing ambiguity in the form of 
competition. The environment became increasingly unstable and the future uncertain. Enterprise 
directors had to take a step into the unknown. It was a period which started in 1991 with great 
expectations and aspirations but by 1997 had, through the erosion of the economic base, 
progressed to fear and trepidation as earlier dreams were unfulfilled. Finally, after the currency 
collapse of 1998, came the unexpected windfalls of import substitution and enhanced exchange 
rate benefits which led to the re-emergence of hope in the future as the expected economic 
deterioration failed to materialise. 
 
By 1998 the relationship between strategy, structure and performance was rewritten to capitalise 
on the emerging opportunities. But this entailed a deliberate destruction of the old business 
methodologies and relationships, the bending of rules, and the creation of a new culture based on 
risk.  In essence it meant the emergence of a new set of core competences driven by a strategic 
leadership geared to handling ambiguity and oriented towards risk taking. A breed not readily 
found in Russia or the VOS enterprises.  
 
 
The Enterprises 
 
OS, established in 1925, was structured around 180 ‘enterprises’ that were training and 
manufacturing centres employing visually impaired workers. These enterprises also acted as the 
focus for the delivery of the organisation’s welfare services. The level of provision varied from 
enterprise to enterprise and included health services, schools, recreation and leisure facilities, housing, holidays and 
free or subsidised food. The enterprises were engaged in production and teaching and had both an employment and a 
social welfare role. The welfare activities were financed jointly by the government, VOS itself and the employees’ 
V 
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pension fund.  They employed over 200,000 people in 1995, 50 per cent of whom were visually handicapped. 
Government aid was conditional on at least 50 per cent of the employees being registered as visually impaired. 
 
Thus, any change process was made even more difficult as VOS enterprise leaders were bound by the 
purpose and ethos of VOS: 
 
 
Figure 1 
To provide employment and welfare services for the visually impaired to ensure their full participation in life. 
 
 
Consequently, strategy and strategic change were conditional on both purpose and ethos. 
 
Considering that we live in an era of evolution it is surprising how rarely people think in evolutionary 
terms. We tend to look at the world around us as a snapshot when it's really a movie, constantly changing. Of course 
we know it's changing but we behave as if it wasn't. We deny the reality of change. So change always surprises us. 
This happened to the majority of the VOS enterprise directors to the extent that over ninety per cent were ultimately 
declared bankrupt.  
 
To put it simply, in the case of the VOS enterprises their extant core competences were found wanting. The 
emergence of unrestricted domestic competition was augmented by that of the developed countries through both 
imports and foreign direct investment. The majority of the VOS enterprises failed to respond, to adapt their core 
competences, to see the wider picture. 
 
According to Hamel and Prahalad, Core Competences (C.C) can be defined as the combination of 
complementary skills and the knowledge embedded in an organization which enables it to perform better than 
competitors in one or more critical processes. 
 
Moreover, adding to this definition, "A Core Competence represents the sum of learning across individual 
skills sets and individual organizational units" (Hamel&Prahalad, 1994). 
  
One of the most debated aspects of C.C. is that competences can lead to internal "rigidities" (Szulanski 
1996, Johnson & Scholes 1999, ), or as Lieberman and Montgomery see it the creation of "incumbent inertia". This 
is because C.C. are a set of different "skills", "assets" and "routines", which may lead to the creation of a 
competitive weapon especially the "routines" that associate "tacit" and "explicit" knowledge (Nonaka 1991) which 
cannot be easily imitated by competitors. On the other hand, the adherence to these "routines" can prevent the 
learning and the development of new C.C. that the conditions of the external environment demand. 
 
The C.C. approach tends to define strategy according to the outcome of underlying competencies that exist 
inside the organization whereby rational and intentional adjustment as regards the different dynamics of the external 
environment are often ignored. Peter Drucker, recognised that C.C. should "fit reality" and be in alignment with the 
mission and the external environment of the organisation. 
 
In the case of the VOS enterprises the majority, in the light of fluid environmental changes, were locked 
into both internal "rigidities" and supported by the "incumbent inertia" of the pre-perestroika era. Strategic 
leadership failed to recognise the sum of the whole in terms of individual skills sets and failed to act on embedded 
knowledge. 
Two enterprises stand out and are examined in depth. One located in South Eastern Moscow (Alexander 
Ovtin) the other in Revda (Ivan Boormatov), in the Central Urals. 
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The former, by 1997, employed 400 (1991: 400 employees) and the latter employed 1250 (1991: 400 
employees) people. The collapse of the industrial base of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meant that 
where, prior to 1993, Enterprise 13 in Moscow could have expected 75% of its output to go to state industries by the 
end of 1994 this figure had fallen to 25%. The Revdan Enterprise suffered similarly with a shortfall of its state 
orders of 80%. Thus, from 1993 these enterprises were to operate on a free and competitive footing with all its 
concomitant opportunities and threats. The cosy, comfort of `Say's Law', where supply creates its own demand, no 
longer held sway. With the cessation of guaranteed raw materials and markets the new order of the day was 
fluctuating demand and competitive pricing. Bad debt became a feature of business life. Change, therefore, required 
that VOS enterprises produce competitive products and introduce new processes and technologies. In other words, to 
develop new and sustainable core competences. However, these new orientations could not readily co-exist with the 
ethos of employing the blind.  
 
„The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new lands but in seeing with new eyes'  Proust 
 
A new orientation for management had to be developed. The strategy/structure/performance relationship 
had to be redrawn. This meant that new cultures and organisational relationships which could adapt and implement 
the new philosophies and strategies had to be built. Juxtaposing the two enterprise directors and examining how they 
reacted to these changing conditions and relationships is illuminating. The contention is that where one tends to be 
reactive (see figure 1), the other, facing the same set of circumstances, tends to be proactive (see figure 2); where 
one operates and conforms to the structures imposed the other breaks the mould and develops expedient strategies 
and solutions; where one is organisational man the other is entrepreneurial in thought and deed. 
 
Alexander Ovtin was steeped in the culture of the pre-Perestroika system being a party member and 
director of Enterprise 13 since 1980. He manipulated the structure from the inside, obtaining soft loans from the 
government by the threat of sacking the visually impaired at a time when the government was seeking foreign 
investment. At the same time he sought a new product and market base (Moscow, St Petersburg, Leningrad) whilst 
introducing Western marketing techniques. In essence, he displayed intra-preneurship characteristics. But did not 
challenge the fundamental strategy/structure/ and performance problems facing the industry.  
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 3, Number 10 
 34 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
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For one however, strategy/structure/and performance became a challenge and opportunity. For example, 
structure became a combination of information, communication and control systems whose development and 
manipulation underpinned the decision making process, a process moreover, dependent on the cult of the personality 
- this was the entrepreneurial director Ivan Boormatov. 
 
 
Barter and Transfer Pricing 
 
With over 70% of all transactions conducted by counter trade due to the rampant inflation and soaring bad 
debts, radical solutions had to be sought. The Entrepreneurial Director did this by force of personality. He 
restructured his organisation; changed the process of manufacturing by producing in-house 50% of the machine tool 
requirements; increased the product base from 2 to 160; manipulated the centre/subsidiary relationship through the 
creation of five satellite enterprises; controlled these on a transfer pricing basis; and recycled the bartered goods 
through the creation of wholly owned retail outlets in regional, and urban centres and when necessary substituted 
barter for wages. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Government aid in the form of tax benefits, reduced rates and subsidies were maintained by keeping the 
visually impaired status through the creation of the satellite enterprises which employed able bodied whilst the 
centre retained the visually impaired. By such means the 50 per cent visually impaired criterion was not breached 
but, the overall size of the organisation was trebled. Strategic growth was aided through the creation of an in-house 
transportation system, an adherence to product quality certification for export (See Map), employment of university 
art graduates for the development of new products and as trainee managers, and the judicious use of transfer pricing. 
All of these combined to produce new core competences. 
 
Agents of Change 
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“There is nothing more difficult to take on hand, or more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than 
to lead in the introduction of a new order of things” Machiavelli 1513 The Prince. 
 
Before the boss was the state now there was a new boss - the market. Decisions were made by the new 
management and if they made any mistakes then wages could not be paid.  
 
Russia’s economic crisis brought many domestic manufacturers a second lease of life as imports collapsed 
in the wake of the rouble’s devaluation in August 1998. However, to capitalise on this windfall the strategic 
foundations had to have been laid. 
 
Post perestroika a new business philosophy was called for to cope with the complexities associated with 
radical strategic change. Inevitably the spotlight falls on the primary change agents, the directors of the enterprises. 
Leadership requires certain actions, such as determining strategic direction, developing human capital, sustaining an 
effective corporate culture, exploiting core competences, establishing strategic controls, and emphasising ethical 
practices. Pre-perestroika most of these actions were not demanded of the directors. Strategic leadership in terms of 
its requirement to; anticipate, envision, maintain flexibility, and empower others to create strategic change was 
anachronistic. As a result the skills combinations of managerial resources were not effectively combined or 
harnessed into competitive management teams. The dearth of these skills combinations may, as can be seen in the 
Enterprises post perestroika, detrimentally impact on organisational performance, as the enterprises fail to 
successfully formulate and implement long-term strategies or engage in innovation that results in competitive 
advantage. It was critical for the success of the enterprise that managers at all levels of the organisation exhibit, to 
some extent, combinations of these skills (See Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Emerging from this study was an awareness of not only the grass root problem of finding entrepreneurial 
managers in Russia but also the problem of changing the cultural norm of non-acceptance of responsibility, the 
desire for certainty and the reticence to cope with increased levels of ambiguity.  
 
Diagrammatically, this can be represented in a non quantitative way: 
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However, both need to transform this early managerial life cycle stage into a core competence based not on 
the individual but rather on the creation of a strategic leadership skills set. This may mean that future development is 
(as indicated in Figure 7) likely to be more balanced, controlled and spread throughout the organisation as part of its 
culture. Ovtin (Organisational Man) will become more entrepreneurial whilst Boormatov (Entrepreneurial) will 
become more organisational. 
 
In a period where ambiguity and risk taking is a major part of the Russian business landscape all businesses 
face the managerial challenge of turning risk averse management into a more systematic, professionally run decision 
making body which can drive their companies forward. 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Both Boormatov and Ovtin displayed entrepreneurship, a desire to dictate their own future, to shape their 
organisations, and protect their employees by confronting change.  
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
 
